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MICHIGAN V. BRYANT: ORIGINALISM CONFRONTS
PRAGMATISM
INTRODUCTION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees those
accused of crimes the right to confront the witnesses against them.1 The
scope of that right, however, is still being calibrated. In fact, the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause has undergone major
revisions in recent decades, evolving from the "reliability" standard of
Ohio v. RobertS2 to the more rigid "testimonial" rule of Crawford v.
Washington.3 Recently, in Michigan v. Bryant,4 the Supreme Court re-
fined the analysis used to determine what constitutes testimony and
thereby implicates the Confrontation Clause.s The application of this new
analysis will inevitably affect the operation of the Confrontation Clause,
and the balance between the rights of victims and the rights of the ac-
cused in criminal law.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of modem Confronta-
tion Clause jurisprudence, with an emphasis on the watershed holding in
Crawford. Part II summarizes the facts, holding, and reasoning of the
majority opinion in Bryant, along with the reasoning of the concurring
opinion and dissenting opinions. Part III explores the contours of the
primary purpose analysis and the ongoing emergency exception articu-
lated in Bryant, and argues that the combined effect narrows the scope of
the Confrontation Clause while expanding judicial discretion. This
Comment concludes that despite powerful pragmatic arguments for this
shift away from emphasizing the rights of the accused, the Bryant deci-
sion ultimately subverts the aims of the Confrontation Clause. Lastly,
this Comment proposes changes to narrow and define the ongoing emer-
gency exception, and alterations to the primary purpose analysis to pro-
mote simplicity and objectivity in confrontation jurisprudence as it con-
tinues to evolve.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
3. 541 U.S. 36, 51-53 (2004); see Aviva Orenstein, Her Last Words: Dying Declarations
and Modern Confrontation Jurisprudence, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1411, 1455-56 (2010) (describing
the Crawford approach as a "wooden, categorical system").
4. 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
5. Id. at 1157-63.
6. See id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence Before Crawford
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides, "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." This right applies to federal
courts and to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.8 The twin aims of the right to confrontation are (1) to pro-
vide the jury an opportunity to evaluate the trustworthiness of a witness's
testimony and (2) to provide the accused a chance to cross-examine and
test the recollection and conscience of a witness.9 Infamous treason trials
in England and the admiralty courts in the colonies spurred the Clause's
inclusion in the Constitution.' 0 The Framers' purpose was to target state
manipulation and abuses against defendants in criminal trials; "thus, the
most important instances in which the Clause restricts the introduction of
out-of-court statements are those in which state actors are involved in a
formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for
trial." 1
The Confrontation Clause seemed inextricably interwoven with the
hearsay rule for most of its history.12 The two concepts were nearly
merged in Justice Blackmun's analysis in Ohio v. Roberts,'3 which ush-
ered in a quarter-century of confrontation jurisprudence that turned on
the question of the reliability of the proffered hearsay evidence. 14 The
language of the Confrontation Clause-"confronted with the witnesses
against him" 1-seems to demand one of two extreme interpretations, as
articulated by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Calfornia v. Green.
On one extreme, the Clause merely provides a procedural guide, "to con-
fer nothing more than a right to meet face to face all those who appear
and give evidence at trial."' 7 On the other extreme, the Clause is "equal-
ly susceptible of being interpreted as a blanket prohibition on the use of
any hearsay testimony."' 8 Struggling to discern a middle path that he
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
9. See Roger W. Kirst, Does Crawford Provide a Stable Foundation for Confrontation
Doctrine?, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 38-39 (2005) (citing Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-
43 (1895)).
10. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 43-49 (2004). The trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, in
particular, will be discussed more fully below. See infra Part LB.
I1. Bryant, 113 S. Ct. at I155.
12. See Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the Meaning of "Testimonial," 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 241, 246 (2005) (arguing for the separation of the two concepts, because confrontation predates
the hearsay rule and not all legal systems recognize both ideas).
13. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
14. Id. at 66.
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. 399 U.S. 164, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Kirst, supra note 9, at 42.




deemed intellectually honest, Justice Harlan first decided confrontation
demanded only that available witnesses testify,19 then the next term land-
ed on the extreme version of the Confrontation Clause that minimized
the right to a procedural mandate of face-to-face examination of witness-
20es, thereby not affecting the admission of hearsay evidence.
Justice Blackmun, however, found a middle path. The Roberts
Court held that the Confrontation Clause is meant to exclude some hear-
say evidence, but not all. 2 1 The test to discern admissible evidence be-
came whether it exhibits "indicia of reliability." 2 2 in turn, reliability was
assured by employing traditional hearsay exceptions.23 Justice Blackmun
justified this middle course by underscoring its pragmatic value. The
reliability standard satisfied the "need for certainty in the workaday
world of conducting criminal trials" 24 and relied on the "Court's demon-
strated success in steering a middle course among proposed alterna-
tives." 2 5 Many lower courts interpreted this decision to mean that Con-
frontation Clause protections were similar to hearsay rule protections
requiring reliability, and subject to "considerable discretion." 26
B. Crawford v. Washington
Crawford transformed the interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause, making this question of criminal procedure one of the most dy-
namic constitutional questions in recent years.27 The decision set aside
the Roberts reliability test and the pragmatism behind it. Justice Scalia
described the Roberts reliability framework as "so unpredictable that it
fails to provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation vio-
lations."28 Justice Scalia turned to an originalist approach to constitution-
al interpretation, examining the history surrounding the Confrontation
Clause text and the Framers' probable meaning.29 He concluded that state
abuses in criminal trials-exemplified by the ex parte testimony that
helped execute Sir Walter Raleigh, and largely left unchecked in the
English colonies-inspired the Clause.30
19. Id. at 179-83.
20. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94-96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980).
22. Id. at 66.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 66 n.9.
26. E.g., People v. Farrell, 34 P.3d 401, 406 (Colo. 2001); see also Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 64 (2004).
27. See G. Michael Fenner, Today's Confrontation Clause (After Crawford and Melendez-
Diaz), 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 35,35 (2009).
28. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63.
29. Id. at 43-50. The question of whether one trusts this is a correct reading of the historical
record is outside the scope of this comment.
30. Id. at 44, 47-50.
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Raleigh's treason trial of 1603 has thus become a lodestar in con-
temporary confrontation jurisprudence, 400 years after the nobleman was
beheaded.3 ' The heroic and enigmatic Raleigh was accused of plotting to
overthrow King James, and "[t]o be blunt, it is likely that [Raleigh] was
guilty."3 2 His guilt, though, is immaterial. The evidence against him was
largely provided by ex parte testimony from his alleged co-conspirator
Lord Cobham, who implicated Raleigh and then later recanted his testi-
mony.33 At trial, the prosecutor refused to produce Cobham for confron-
tation, despite Raleigh's repeated calls for the opportunity to confront his
accuser. 34
All this is but one accusation of my Lord Cobham's, I heat no other
thing; to which accusation he never subscribed nor avouched it. I be-
seech you, my lords, let Cobham be sent for, charge him on his soul,
on his allegiance to the king; if he affirm it, I am guilty. 35
In a colloquial sense, the question posed by a confrontation case to-
day is whether the absent witness resembles Lord Cobham, as the focus
of scrutiny shifted from the word "confrontation" to the word "witness."
The holding of Crawford can be reduced to a syllogism: the accused
has a right to confront witnesses; witnesses are those who bear testimo-
ny; therefore, the accused must be allowed to confront anyone who bears
testimony.36 Thus, the reliability standard became a testimonial standard.
The Court held that testimonial hearsay was not allowed unless (1) the
witness was unavailable and (2) there was a prior opportunity to examine
the testimony through cross-examination. The strict, categorical separa-
tion of evidence into testimonial and nontestimonial strengthened the
Confrontation Clause in one sense while reducing its scope in another
sense. If evidence is deemed testimonial, it must be subjected to cross-
examination or barred.38 If evidence is nontestimonial, the Confrontation
Clause simply does not apply.39 As a result, the question of whether evi-
dence is testimonial became paramount.
31. See Chris Hutton, Sir Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re- Vamps Two Dec-
ades of Confrontation Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 51 (2005).
32. Allen D. Boyer, The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh: The Law of Treason, the Trial of Trea-
son and the Origins of the Confrontation Clause, 74 Miss. L.J. 869, 872 (2005).
33. Id at 885, 893.
34. Id at 889-90.
35. Id at 890.
36. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
37. Id at 68.
38. Id Two exceptions to this rule are forfeiture and possibly dying declarations. Forfeiture of
the confrontation right by wrongdoing applies only if the defendant intended to deprive the court of
the witness's testimony. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-61 (2008). It remains an open
question whether dying declarations are allowable testimonial hearsay as a historical exception to
recent confrontation jurisprudence, a question that some members of the Court look forward to
exploring more deeply. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1177 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Orenstein, supra note 3, at 1440-41.
39. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
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The facts of Crawford made this distinction fairly straightforward.
Michael Crawford allegedly stabbed another man to avenge the attempt-
ed rape of his wife, Sylvia Crawford.40 When Sylvia Crawford submitted
to an interrogation at the police station, she made statements that could
have damaged her husband's claim of self defense; specifically, she said
the decedent did not have a weapon in his hand, contrary to her hus-
band's claim. 41 At trial, Sylvia Crawford chose not to testify against her
husband, but the prosecution wanted to use her earlier statements. 42 The
Court found that a declarant's statements during a formal police interro-
gation several hours after the event were testimonial, and thus admission
of the evidence without the opportunity to cross examine the witness
violated the Confrontation Clause.43 In his concurrence, Chief Justice
Rehnquist predicted that by swapping the reliability test for the testimony
test, the Court had simply created a new area of confusion.44
C. Davis v. Washington and the Primary Purpose Test
Later Confrontation Clause cases required a more nuanced distinc-
tion between testimonial and nontestimonial evidence.45 The Court began
to refine its definition of "testimony" in Davis. There, the Court issued
one decision consolidating two domestic violence cases, finding that one
involved testimonial evidence while the other did not. In Davis, the
declarant's statements came during a 911 call; Michelle McCottry called
while she was being attacked, identifying her attacker as her former boy-
friend, Adrian Davis.47 When she did not appear at trial, the prosecution
sought to introduce the statements made during the 911 call. 48 In
Hammon, the declarant's statements came after the police had arrived at
the scene of a domestic disturbance.4 9 Police responded to a reported
domestic disturbance after Hershel Hammon allegedly punched Amy
Hammon and pushed her into broken glass.50 One police officer ques-
tioned Amy Hammon regarding what had transpired, and the other of-
ficer remained with her husband, who repeatedly tried to interrupt the
questioning." Subsequently, Ms. Hammon was subpoenaed to testify at
her husband's trial, and when she did not appear, the interviewing of-
40. Id. at 38.
41. Id. at 38-40.
42. Id. at 40.
43. Id. at 61, 68.
44. Id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
45. See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823 (2006) ("The Davis case today does not
permit us this luxury of indecision.").
46. Id. at 829-30 (finding the statements nontestimonial in Davis, but testimonial in Hammon
v. Indiana).
47. Id. at 817 18.
48. Id. at 819.





ficer, over defense counsel objections, proceeded to testify as to her prior
statements.52
Davis introduced the objective "primary purpose test" to determine
what statements are testimonial.5 3 If the primary purpose of an interroga-
tion is to generate evidence for later use at trial, then it is testimonial; if
the primary purpose is to resolve an ongoing emergency, then it is
nontestimonial. 54 Applying this new test, the Court found that the state-
ments in Davis-made during a 911 call while the victim was being at-
tacked and seeking help-had the primary purpose of resolving an ongo-
ing emergency.55 In contrast, statements in Hammon-made after the
police had taken control of the scene and resolved the immediate
threat-were no longer meant to resolve an emergency, and were indeed
testimonial. Thus, McCottry's statements made during Davis's attack
were admissible under the Confrontation Clause, while Amy Hammon's
statements about her husband's attack were barred.
II. MICHIGAN V. BRYANT
A. Facts
Anthony Covington lay dying of a gunshot wound in a gas station
parking lot when the police were summoned on April 29, 200 1.51 Offic-
ers questioned Covington while waiting for paramedics to arrive, and
Covington told them "Rick" shot him.59 Covington also told police that
he spoke to Richard Bryant through Bryant's back door, and then was
shot through the door as he turned to leave at about 3 a.m.60 Covington
did not disclose the contents of the conversation, but it was later revealed
that Covington regularly bought cocaine from Bryant at Bryant's back
door.61 After being shot, Covington drove his car to a gas station six
blocks away, where police found him roughly twenty-five minutes after
the shooting.62
Covington died a few hours later. 63 By the time police arrived at
Bryant's home in Detroit, Michigan, he had fled, and he was not arrested
until a year later in California.
52. Id at 820.
53. Id at 822.
54. Id
55. McCottry's statements became testimonial after the attacker fled and the 911 operator
began to concentrate on identifying information about the attacker, such as his middle name, but
only her early identifying statements were challenged. Id. at 828-29.
56. Id. at 829-30.
57. Id. at 829, 834.
58. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
59. Id
60. Id.
61. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009).
62. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150; see also People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67.




Police officers testified at trial, repeating the statements Covington
made to them that implicated Bryant in the shooting.65 The statements
were admitted into evidence under the Roberts reliability standard and
Bryant was convicted, inter alia, of second-degree murder.66 The Michi-
gan Court of Appeals subsequently affirmed the conviction months after
the Supreme Court's decision in Crawford instituted the testimonial
standard. 67 Bryant then appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, con-
tending that Covington's declarations to police should not have been
admitted at trial; the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the
Michigan Court of Appeals for further consideration in light of Davis.
On remand, the Michigan Court of Appeals again affirmed the convic-
tion in an unpublished opinion; the Michigan Supreme Court reversed
this decision, concluding that Covington's statements were indeed testi-
monial hearsay and should not have been admitted at trial because it vio-
lated the Confrontation Clause.69 The state of Michigan petitioned for
certiorari on the issue of whether Covington's statements were testimo-
nial, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.7 0
C. Majority Opinion
Justice Sotomayor wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and Alito. The majority
held that Covington's statements were not testimonial because the prima-
ry purpose of the declarations was to resolve an ongoing emergency.71
To reach this conclusion, the Court refined and expanded the primary
purpose test used to determine what statements are considered testimoni-
al.
As a threshold issue, the Court acknowledged that Covington was
(1) unavailable to testify at trial, and (2) the accused did not have a
chance to cross-examine the witness.72 Therefore, if the declarant's
statements were found to be testimonial, admitting them at trial would
violate the Confrontation Clause. Then, the Court turned to the principal
issue: were Covington's statements to police testimonial?
First, the Court reiterated that the primary purpose test is an objec-
tive inquiry.73 This means that the relevant inquiry is not the actual, sub-
64. Id.atll64.
65. Id. at 1150.
66. Id.
67. People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WLl882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004)
(per curiam).
68. People v. Bryant, 722 N.W.2d 797 (Mich. 2006).
69. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 73 (Mich. 2009).
70. Michigan v. Bryant, 130 S. Ct. 1685 (2010).
71. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1166-67 (2011).
72. Id. at 1151.
73. Id.atll56.
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jective purpose of the actors, but rather "the purpose that reasonable par-
ticipants would have had." 74 Second, Justice Sotomayor expanded the
framework of the primary purpose test and concluded that it is incorrect
to interpret Davis as asking whether the primary purpose is testimonial or
to resolve an ongoing emergency. 5 Instead, the proper inquiry is whether
the primary purpose of the interrogation is testimonial or for any other
purpose. Thus, an ongoing emergency is properly understood as one
factor-albeit an important one-that reflects on the primary purpose of
an interrogation.77 If the interrogation primarily serves any purpose other
than producing testimony, then it falls outside the scope of the Confron-
tation Clause.7 1
Third, the chief factors that help elucidate the primary purpose in-
clude (1) the presence of an ongoing emergency, (2) the formality of the
interrogation, and (3) the statements and actions of the actors.7 9 Evaluat-
ing these factors is a context-dependent inquiry that must take into ac-
count the particular circumstances of the interrogation and balance the
multiple factors.80 Hence, the presence of an ongoing emergency is the
first factor to consider, but it is not dispositive.8 1 Justice Sotomayor as-
serted that a court should consider the circumstances of the emergency
and how they weigh upon the purpose of the actors, such as the weapon
used, the medical condition of the victim, and the range of victims at
risk.12
The second factor-the evaluation of the formality of the interroga-
tion-is more straightforward. A court should consider whether the inter-
rogation was at the police station or the crime scene, how organized the
questioning seemed, and whether there were signs of formality such as a
written affidavit.83 The third factor to weigh is how the statements and
actions of the actors reflect on the intent of the interrogation. The majori-
ty held that because the purpose of the entire exchange is at issue, a court
should consider the behavior of the declarant as well as the behavior of
the interrogator. 84 Finally, the majority drew an analogy between the
ongoing emergency factor and the excited-utterance exception to hear-
say. Just as the excited-utterance is considered reliable because the de-
clarant's attention is riveted on the present moment, statements made
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1160.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1153 ("We therefore limited the Confrontation Clause's reach to testimonial state-
ments .
79. Id.at 1157-61.
80. Id. at 1158.
81. Id. at ll60.
82. Id. at 1158-59.




during an ongoing emergency are less likely to be testimonial because
the declarant's attention is captured by the emergency.
Applying this analysis, the Court found that Covington's interroga-
tion in the gas station parking lot was informal and disorganized, and that
the behavior of the actors indicated their primary purpose was to resolve
an emergency.86 Further factors militated for the finding of an ongoing
emergency, including the use of a gun,87 the grave medical condition of
the victim,88 and that the offender was still at large, potentially putting
others at risk.89 Therefore, the Court concluded that the primary purpose
of Covington's statements was not testimonial hearsay, and the state-
ments were not within the scope of the Confrontation Clause.90
D. Concurring Opinion
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued the
proper inquiry is not the primary purpose test, but the bright-line rule of
formality. 91 The only relevant question, in his view, was whether the
declarant's statements were formal and solemn enough to be considered
testimonial hearsay. 92 Justice Thomas's concept of formality includes
indicia of solemnity such as affidavits, depositions, or organized interro-
gations in police custody,93 as occurred in Crawford.94 These formal law
enforcement actions mirror the historical practices that the Confrontation
Clause was designed to defeat.9 5 In turn, Justice Thomas criticized "the
primary-purpose test as 'an exercise in fiction' that is 'disconnected from
history' and 'yields no predictable results."' 96
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment because the interrogation
was informal-as the police arrived at a gas station parking lot to find
the declarant bleeding from a fatal gunshot wound-and thus did not
implicate the Confrontation Clause. 9 7
E. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Scalia
Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion that sharply criticized the
majority's analysis. Justice Scalia, who authored the majority opinions in
Crawford and Davis, argued that the Bryant majority betrayed Crawford
85. Id. at 1157.
86. Id at 1160,1165-66.
87. Id. at 1164.
88. Id at 1165.
89. Id at 1163-64.
90. Id. at 1167.
91. Id. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
92. Id
93. Id
94. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 65 (2004).
95. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167.
96. Id (citing Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 838-39 (2006)) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)).
97. Id. at 1167-68.
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rather than following the decision, and got Bryant wrong on the facts as
well as the law.98 On the facts, the ruling that the interrogation of Cov-
ington by five police officers was for the purpose of resolving an emer-
gency rather than producing testimony was, in Justice Scalia's opinion,
"transparently false" and "patently incorrect." 99 Nevertheless, Justice
Scalia saved his most fiery criticism for what he saw as the mistakes of
the majority on the law of confrontation. 00 He agreed with the majority
opinion that the primary purpose test is an objective one,o but on little
else.102
First, he departed from the majority on whose perspective should be
considered. While the majority found the purpose of both the declarant
and the interrogator relevant, Justice Scalia contended "[t]he declarant's
intent is what counts."10 3 By blending the motives of the declarant and
the police, both of whom might have mixed motives, the Court compli-
cated the inquiry instead of clarifying it.10 4 However, even under the ma-
jority's rubric of taking the officers' intent into account, Justice Scalia
would have found the statements testimonial."0 s
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the majority set a dangerously
broad precedent for what constitutes an ongoing emergency.' 06 By imply-
ing the emergency may continue until an armed shooter is apprehended,
"[t]he Court's distorted view creates an expansive exception to the Con-
frontation Clause for violent crimes." 0 7
Third, Justice Scalia contended that the reintroduction of reliability
is incompatible with the framework the Court built in Crawford, and
mused that the Court might intend to overrule Crawford by degrees if not
explicitly.'08 Specifically, the majority opinion analogized the ongoing
emergency factor to the excited-utterance exception to hearsay, implying
that cross-examination is unnecessary if the information is reliable, and
reigniting the relationship between the Confrontation Clause and the
reliability test rejected in Crawford.109 The author of Crawford was not
pleased by this development. Fourth, the multi-factor balancing test con-
cocted by the majority is too complex, according to Justice Scalia, and
98. Id. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. ("Instead of clarifying the law, the Court makes itself the obfuscator of last resort.").
101. Id.
102. See id. at 1168-76. Justice Scalia argued the majority was wrong on whose purpose mat-
ters, wrong on its finding of a primary purpose of emergency, wrong on its expansive view of an
ongoing emergency, wrong to resurrect indicia of reliability, wrong to foster an open-ended balanc-
ing test, and, mostly, wrong to enfeeble the Confrontation Clause. Id
103. Id.at1l68.
104. Id. at 1170.
105. Id. at ll71-72.
106. Id. at 1173.
107. Id.
108. Id.at1175.
109. Id. at 1174.
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will lead to an unpredictable, open-ended inquiry. 0 In sum, the majori-
ty's opinion results in "an enfeebled view of the right to confronta-
tion."I'
F. Dissenting Opinion: Justice Ginsburg
Justice Ginsburg wrote a separate, dissenting opinion. Justice Gins-
burg agreed with Justice Scalia that (1) Covington's statements were
testimonial hearsay because they involved a past crime and (2) the de-
clarant's point-of-view, rather than that of the interrogator, is the proper
factor to weigh.1 2 Justice Ginsburg argued that the Court's majority
opinion not only creates an overly broad exception to the Confrontation
Clause, but also "confounds our recent Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence" by reintroducing reliability into the analysis of what statements
are testimonial." 3
Justice Ginsburg added that the question of whether dying declara-
tions should be barred by the Confrontation Clause remains unanswered.
Although not preserved for appeal in Bryant, Justice Ginsburg indicated
that she would like to "take up the question whether the exception for
dying declarations survives [the Court's] recent Confrontation Clause
decisions."'14
III. ANALYSIS
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence has shifted dramatically in re-
cent years, from the loose reliability test of Roberts to the categorical
testimony approach of Crawford."' Although Bryant was ostensibly a
refinement of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence following Crawford,
the Court's analysis effectively pushed the pendulum back in the direc-
tion of the unfettered discretion of pre-Crawford decisions."16 The prima-
ry purpose test articulated by the Court in Bryant is extremely elastic and
difficult to apply predictably."' The tension between the analysis in
Crawford and Bryant squarely pits the more idealistic rule of the former
110. Id. at 1175-76.
Ill. Id.at1173.
112. Id at 1176 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. Id at 1176-77.
114. Id.at1177.
115. Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 72-73 (1980) (finding that preliminary hearing
testimony of a witness who was unavailable at the trial was permissible where the witness' testimony
bore significant "indicia of reliability"), with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51-52 (2004)
(holding that out-of-court "testimonial" statements, including prior testimony at preliminary hearing,
before a grand jury, at a former trial, or statements elicited during police interrogation, are inadmis-
sible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine
witness).
116. Richard D. Friedman, Preliminary Thoughts on the Bryant Decision, THE
CONFRONTATION BLOG (Mar. 2, 2011, 12:42 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/
search?updated-max=2011-06-15TI4%3A49%3A00-04%3A00 ("[T]his decision strikes me as a
giant step backwards towards a morass like that of Ohio v. Roberts . . .
117. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1175-76 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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against the pragmatic standard of the latter. While the pragmatism of
allowing more judicial discretion in criminal prosecutions is appealing,
neutering the Confrontation Clause in the face of strong state interests
runs contrary to the meaning of the Framers.'18
A. Critique of the Bryant Test
Perhaps the two most transparent ramifications of Bryant are the
broader ongoing emergency exception to testimony and the expanding
elasticity of the primary purpose test. This Comment argues that the
Court muddied the water by transforming the narrow emergency excep-
tion into a broad and indeterminate factor within the primary purpose
analysis. Then, this Comment turns to the primary purpose analysis it-
self, arguing that the changes wrought in Bryant render the test too mal-
leable, and thereby defeat the policy of Crawford.
1. Parameters for Ongoing Emergency Are Too Broad
In Bryant, the situation was deemed an ongoing emergency six
blocks away from the crime scene and a half hour after the shooting, with
no indication of an ongoing threat. 119 The Court set up a clear demarca-
tion in Davis/Hammon between a police officer seeking to know what is
happening during an ongoing emergency and an officer seeking to know
what happened to preserve testimony. 120 In Davis, a frantic call to 911
while an attack was occurring was declared an ongoing emergency,
while in Hammon an interrogation just after an attack was not.121
In Bryant, the Court erased this line, as several officers specifically
asked "what happened?" in the wake of an attack, displaying no worry of
a continuing threat, and yet the situation was deemed an ongoing emer-
gency.122 Justice Sotomayor prescribed a mix of factors in the context-
dependent evaluation of whether an emergency is ongoing, including the
choice of weapon, medical condition of actors, and the range of victims
at risk.123 This mix of factors suggests broad discretion in the ongoing
emergency inquiry. In a case like Bryant, the presence of a gun increased
the duration and scope of the emergency,1 24 the dire medical condition of
the victim expanded the emergency,125 and the range of potential victims
was hard to determine because it was not a domestic attack. 2 6 The Court
reasoned that an emergency continues when an armed shooter with an
unknown motive is still on the loose, even with no other indication of an
118. Seeid.at 1174.
119. People v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 67 (Mich. 2009).
120. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829-30 (2006).
121. Id. at 827, 29-30.
122. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1163-64 (majority opinion).
123. Id.at1158-59.
124. Id.




ongoing threat: "This is not to suggest that the emergency continued until
Bryant was arrested in California a year after the shooting. We need not
decide precisely when the emergency ended . ... It is difficult to
know whether the Court need not make that distinction or cannot make
that distinction, because under the reasoning of Bryant there is no explic-
it principle to limit the duration of the emergency, allowing it to stretch
over many months and miles.
The uncertainty created by the Court is precisely the problem. Low-
er courts are left with little guidance as to when an ongoing emergency
might end after the destruction of the logic in Davis/Hammon. Hewing
close to those decisions, the emergency in Bryant would have ended after
Covington fled and his attacker failed to follow.' 28 By extending the
scope of the emergency indefinitely, the Court created yet another guess-
ing game about how the choice of weapon, medical condition, and rela-
tionship to the victim might expand the emergency. 29 Richard Bryant
was an armed shooter with an unknown motive, on the loose until he was
caught in California.13 0 He had killed once, so the majority concluded
that others were at risk until he was apprehended.' 3 ' Under Bryant,
statements made in police interviews during this year-long period about
what happened during the crime, whether with Bryant's girlfriend, Cov-
ington's brother, or a host of other witnesses, could conceivably be ad-
mitted with no right to cross-examine their testimony.132
Or, take the example of a serial rapist, armed with a gun, who is ter-
rorizing a city with random attacks. The attacker has a gun, leaves his
victims seriously injured, and is still on the loose. Based on the Bryant
Court's analysis, this emergency is ongoing. The entire city is at risk for
a possible attack. As the city's police force works overtime canvassing
the city, would all of its interrogations related to the serial rapist be to
serve an ongoing emergency? If a citizen rushes to divulge the suspicious
sexual proclivities of his neighbors, or a relative of a convicted sex of-
fender reveals that she thinks he has violated probation in some way, can
those statements be introduced in separate trials without cross-
examination because they were gathered for the primary purpose of re-
solving an ongoing emergency? The Bryant Court threw the door open to
never-ending emergencies with no instructions on how to close it again.
The effect of broadening the ongoing emergency exception is to
narrow the scope of what is considered testimonial for purposes of the
127. Id. at 1164-65 (citation omitted).
128. See id. at 1170-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
129. See id. at 1173.
130. Id at 1163-64 (majority opinion).
131. See id.
132. See id at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Confrontation Clause. 13 3 The Court also adjusted the framework of the
inquiry from testimonial versus ongoing emergency to testimonial versus
any other purpose, thereby greatly increasing the territory of
nontestimonial statements. 134 These changes invite judicial creativity in
trying to understand what the Court might intend by any other purpose.
Also, as lower courts attempt to apply Bryant, they must do so with no
guidance or analytical justification to decide when an emergency involv-
ing an armed attacker on the loose might be deemed complete.
2. The Primary Purpose Test Is Unnecessarily Elastic and
Open-ended
The majority in Bryant acknowledged that its multi-factor balancing
approach is complex, but argued that the complexity will engender accu-
racy: "Simpler is not always better, and courts making a 'primary pur-
pose' assessment should not be unjustifiably restrained from consulting
all relevant information. ... " However, it appears more likely that the
complexity of the primary purpose test will yield unpredictability and
confusion for at least four reasons, considered below.
a. The Attempt to Measure Subjective Motives with the
"Objective" Primary Purpose Test
The Court's repeated assertions that the primary purpose test is ob-
jective cannot stop the analysis from bleeding into subjectivity and
guesswork. In Davis, the Court created the primary purpose test to de-
termine which statements are testimonial by discerning the purpose of a
police interrogation.136 Justice Thomas, concurring in part and dissenting
in part, correctly opined that unpredictability was among the chief criti-
cisms leveled at the reliability inquiry, and yet Justice Scalia and the
Court adopted an equally unpredictable inquiry with the primary purpose
test. 137 "[P]ronouncement of the 'primary' motive behind the interroga-
tion calls for nothing more than a guess by courts."' 38 The irony is that
the primary purpose test was put forth by a jurist who ridicules the idea
of discerning the purpose of legislators, and yet seems to believe it easier
to discern the purpose of a battered spouse just after a traumatic inci-
dent.13 9 As Justice Scalia has convincingly argued, "[t]he number of pos-
133. See id at 1158-59 (majority opinion) (listing factors to consider during an "ongoing
emergency" analysis, thus expanding the exception and narrowing the definition of "testimonial"
statements).
134. Id. at 1160.
135. Id at 1162.
136. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
137. Id at 834 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Id at 841-42.
139. Compare Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 637 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("To
look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not
exist."), with Davis, 547 U.S. at 830 (majority opinion) ("Objectively viewed, the primary, if not
indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation was to investigate a possible crime .... ).
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sible motivations, to begin with, is not binary, or indeed even finite,"o
because myriad human motivations are always in play and shifting in
primacy by the moment. The quest for a primary purpose, as Justice
Scalia argued in other contexts, is a search for "something that does not
exist."l41
Attempting to follow Davis, the Court in Bryant devised an awk-
ward formulation, trying to apprehend "the purpose that reasonable par-
ticipants would have had." 42 The thin membrane separating the objective
primary purpose test from a subjective free-for-all was thus further erod-
ed by Bryant. In the majority opinion, the Court made a subtle but im-
portant shift from the purpose of the interrogation to the purpose of the
participants.143 Necessarily then, the test no longer looks solely at the
external facts of the interrogation, but now seeks to discover the reasona-
ble purpose of each actor.
This shift dramatically changes the meaning of the word "purpose"
in the primary purpose test. When the word "purpose" is applied to
something like an interrogation, it is understood to mean the function or
use of that encounter. 1The interrogation has no internal purpose; rather,
it serves a purpose. However, in this context, when the word "purpose" is
applied to a participant, the meaning changes to include internal motiva-
tions and that person's "conscious object." 4 5 Examine the question of-
fered by the Court: What purpose would a reasonable participant have
had? 46 Do we still mean: What was the participant's function and use?
Or do we instead mean: What would motivate the reasonable participant
in this situation? 4 7 The latter is the only sensible meaning. Thus, the
purpose test has evolved from an inquiry into function to a far more un-
* - *148
certain inquiry into motive.
The natural question is whether an inquiry into human purpose can
truly be objective or even ascertainable. A test to decipher human pur-
pose is fundamentally different than an objective test to discern the func-
tion of an interrogation. Turning to familiar objective tests, a contract is
140. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-37.
141. Id. at 637.
142. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
143. Compare Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 ("Statements are nontestimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of
the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency." (emphasis added)),
with Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 ("[Tihe relevant inquiry is . . . the purpose that reasonable partici-
pants would have had. . . ." (emphasis added)).
144. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (9th ed. 2009) ("An objective, goal, or end ...
the business activity that a corporation is chartered to engage in.").
145. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (2001).
146. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156.
147. The crux of the inquiry is motive rather than intent, as we are trying to discover why the
participant is speaking rather than his resolve to speak. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note
144, at 881 ("While motive is the inducement to do some act, intent is the mental resolution or
determination to do it.").
148. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. ati 160-61; see also supra note 147.
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formed when external behavior indicates offer and acceptance, and
courts explicitly reject evidence of internal motivations.14 9 The tort of
negligence occurs when external behavior is unreasonable, a standard
that Judge Learned Hand even reduced to a mathematical calculation that
ignores internal motivation. 1o The primary purpose test no longer bears
any resemblance to these objective tests. Instead, the primary purpose
test asks, given a set of external stimuli, what internal purpose would a
reasonable person have had? As Professor Wigmore has explained, de-
termining motive is a slippery enterprise because it requires leaps in log-
ic from external circumstances, to emotion, to action."' Now transfer
that slippery enterprise from the context of criminal guilt to the primary
purpose test. Imagine not only trying to determine whether A killed B,
but why A killed B, and what percentage of A's internal motivation can
be ascribed to various desires. That is the formidable and sometimes im-
possible analytical task the Court has assigned itself and lower courts.
Thankfully, an accused may be convicted with no evidence of motive;
however, under the primary purpose test, the arduous determination of
motive is the very heart of the test, as the trial judge attempts to deter-
mine what purpose a reasonable participant would have had.152
The problem, of course, is that every actor is invested with mixed,
contradictory, and unverifiable motives that a trial judge must now sift
through and rank. A court in this case might plausibly have found that
one of several purposes were, in fact, primary. For example, the Court
treated Covington's medical condition as evidence that his motivation
was to get immediate help and his statements were thus
nontestimonial.s 3 However, a grievous wound might also excite a desire
for revenge in a reasonable victim, and it is plausible to treat his state-
ments as a solemn declaration meant to condemn his attacker at trial,
undoubtedly leading to a determination that the victim's declaration is
testimonial. A trial judge might also reasonably conclude that a drug
addict who witnesses a crime, when surrounded by inquisitive police
officers, has the primary purpose of revealing as little as possible that
could send him to prison, and his statements are thus nontestimonial.
Because the declarant in a Confrontation Clause case is necessarily una-
vailable, gathering the pieces of these primary purpose puzzles will be
difficult if not impossible.
149. See Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 S.E.2d 516, 521-22 (1954) (explaining that Zehmer's internal
motivation to pull a joke was irrelevant; only external behavior was considered).
150. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (explaining B<PL,
or whether the burden is less than the probability of injury multiplied by the likely gravity of a
resulting injury).
151. JoHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 76 (1935) ("The
term 'motive' is unfortunately ambiguous. That feeling which internally urges or pushes a person to
do or refrain from doing an act is an emotion, and is of course evidential towards his doing or not
doing the act.").
152. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1156 (2011).
153. Id. at 1165.
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The inquiry "will inevitably be, quite simply, an exercise in fic-
tion."l 54 Summoning the term "objective" will not allow courts to sepa-
rate the indivisible or discern what simply cannot be known. The Court
in Bryant repeatedly mentioned objectivity while shuffling toward sub-
jectivity.'55 The practical impact is that lower courts must now make
inquiries based on guesswork and without the benefit of a discernible
animating principle. Thus, the resulting opinions will be unpredictable
and contradictory, undermining the legitimacy of the enterprise.
b. Many Purposes, No Guidance: Combining the Declarant's
Purpose and the Interrogator's Purpose
The Court exacerbated the purpose problem in Bryant by blending
the intent of the declarant and the intent of police officers into a single
analysis.15 6 Because the Court shifted its focus to the internal motivation
of each actor rather than the external facts of an interrogation, it was
forced to answer the question of whose purpose will be considered.157
Faced with this choice, the Court chose everybody involved.'58 This adds
confusion, not clarity.5 9
In Bryant, the Court weighed the purposes a reasonable participant
would have had while in Covington's situation dying in a gas station
parking lot' 6 0 and the purposes a reasonable participant would have had
as she stepped into the form of each of five police officers.' 6 ' A partici-
pant in Covington's shoes could have at least four plausible purposes:
medical help, revenge through prosecution, concealing information, or
no conscious motive.' 62 Then the picture gets murkier. Police officers in
particular must "act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely
unverifiable motives-their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps
as well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence from the suspect."
Thus, the ambiguity of the primary purpose test grows more profound
because a police officer's motives will almost always be mixed between
handling an emergency situation and creating evidence for trial.'6 Not
only is the Court attempting to probe the elusive concept of motive, but
154. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 839 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
155. The majority opinion summoned the word "objective" or "objectively" in relation to the
relevant inquiry at least twenty times. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150-67.
156. Id.atil60-61.
157. See id. at 1160-62.
158. See id. at 1160 ("[T]he statements and actions of both the declarant and interrogators
provide objective evidence of the primary purpose of the interrogation.").
159. Id. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("But adding in the mixed motives of the police only
compounds the problem.").
160. Id. at 1161-62 (majority opinion).
161. Id. at l63-64.
162. Seeid.at 1161.
163. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
164. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at I161 ("Their dual responsibilities may mean that [police officers] act
with different motives simultaneously or in quick succession.").
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in this case the uncertainty was multiplied to include the mixed motives
of six separate actors. The Court offered few clues as to how to weigh
the purposes of various participants. All are to be considered, but the
importance of each is unknown.16 5
c. Reintroduction of Hearsay Reliability Rules
Justice Sotomayor and the Court explored the link between the on-
going emergency exception to testimonial evidence and the excited utter-
ance exception to hearsay evidence, noting that both rest on the idea of
added reliability because the exciting event does not allow the declarant
time to fabricate a lie.166 This is a startling reversion in Confrontation
Clause jurisprudence; the Court merged principles of hearsay rules with
Confrontation Clause protections in Roberts,16 7 and then forcefully
ripped them apart in Crawford.'68 The Court made clear in Whorton v.
Bockting 6 9 that the Crawford rule both strengthened and narrowed the
Confrontation Clause, restricting testimonial statements by removing
reliability exceptions, but also allowing unreliable nontestimonial state-
ments.17 0 Quite simply, reliability was no longer part of Confrontation
Clause analysis, and cross-examination became the only relevant indicia
of reliability.171
Then, in Bryant, reliability was reintroduced as one of the many fac-
tors relevant to the consideration of testimonial versus nontestimonial
statements.172 Justice Scalia argued adamantly that this reincarnation of
Roberts reliability made no sense: "The Court attempts to fit its resur-
rected interest in reliability into the Crawford framework, but the result
is incoherent."173 He shared his suspicion that perhaps this was an at-
165. The consideration of each actor's intent also enlivens the question of whose purpose
prevails when the interrogator's intent and the declarant's intent are starkly at odds, such as when a
co-conspirator's statement is told to a government agent. From the declarant's perspective, the
conversation is not testimonial whatsoever; from the interrogator's perspective, the sole intent is to
produce testimony. As Justice Scalia noted sarcastically in his dissent: "If the dastardly police trick a
declarant into giving an incriminating statement against a sympathetic defendant, a court can focus
on the police's intent and declare the statement testimonial." Id at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1157 (majority opinion).
167. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
168. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63 (2004).
169. 549 U.S. 406 (2007).
170. Id. at 419-20 ("Under Roberts, an out-of-court nontestimonial statement not subject to
prior cross-examination could not be admitted without a judicial determination regarding reliability.
Under Crawford, on the other hand, the Confrontation Clause has no application to such statements
and therefore permits their admission even if they lack indicia of reliability.").
171. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. The Court put it most colorfully, while describing the need to
confront forensic analysts: "[W]e would reach the same conclusion if all analysts always possessed
the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Theresa." Melendez-Diaz v. Massa-
chusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 n.6 (2009).
172. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011) (discussing the probability of
fabrication as relevant to the primary purpose inquiry).
173. Id at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tempt to kill Crawford through a thousand cuts rather than overruling it
directly. 174
The confusion caused by reintroducing reliability into the testimo-
nial standard became evident almost immediately in the subsequent Con-
frontation Clause case considered by the Court, Bullcoming v. New Mex-
ico.175 Justice Kennedy wrote in his dissent that reliability is an "essential
part of the constitutional inquiry" after the Bryant decision,17 6 while Jus-
tice Sotomayor retorted in her concurrence that Bryant deemed reliability
relevant but not essential.177
Justice Scalia is correct that marrying reliability to the testimonial
standard is simply illogical. The reliability standard is entirely separate
from the testimonial standard; in fact, the two standards often have an
inverse relationship.'78 In Bullcoming, for example, the formal certifica-
tion of lab tests added reliability, thereby facilitating admissibility under
hearsay rules, while the formal certification also made the evidence more
clearly testimonial, blocking admissibility without confrontation. 7 9
Holding that reliability is a factor that argues for evidence being
nontestimonial is a bald contradiction to the logic of Crawford and does
nothing but add another layer of analytical confusion for lower courts to
attempt to unscramble.
d. Malleable Multi-Factor Balancing Test
The Court in Bryant created a multi-factor balancing test, but the
weight and relationship of the many factors is unclear. An ongoing
emergency can be considered in light of at least three sub-factors;' 80 the
formality of the interrogation can be considered in light of several sub-
factors;'8 ' the statements and actions of all actors can be considered, as
they indicate the balance of purposes at play;' 82 and, finally, even the
traditional exceptions to hearsay might be considered as indications of
reliability.183 The majority approach "requires judges to conduct 'open-
ended balancing tests' and 'amorphous, if not entirely subjective,' inquir-
174. Id.
175. 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
176. Id. at 2725 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
177. Id at 2720 n. I (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
178. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) ("[E]x parte examinations might some-
times be admissible under modem hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly would not have condoned
them.").
179. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2725 ("Crawford ... line of cases has treated the reliability of
evidence as a reason to exclude it.").
180. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1158-59 (2011) (weapon used, medical condition,
range of possible victims).
181. Id. at 1160 (level of organization, public or private, while waiting for medical treatment).
182. Id at 1160-62 (statements of all participants, along with the physical state of victim,
existence of emergency, and "all relevant information").
183. Id. at 1157, 1162 n.12.
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ies into the totality of the circumstances bearing upon reliability." The
Court seemed to follow the advice of Yogi Berra: "When you come to a
fork in the road, take it." 85
The majority in Bryant catalogued many factors that are not disposi-
tive-not even an ongoing emergency settles the matter-but did not
give clues about what should be dispositive.186 Instead, trial courts must
weigh the choice of weapons, the details of medical conditions, and the
scope of risk to evaluate emergency,187 then look for indications of for-
mality that one might analogize to ancient British trials,188 then conduct a
deep-dive into the psychology of internal human motivations for each of
several actors,1 89 and then finally consider how the reliability conferred
by hearsay exceptions might help determine whether statements are tes-
timonial.190 After all this, trial judges must weigh possibly competing
conclusions on emergency, formality, purpose, and reliability against
each other in an abstruse and mysterious calculus.
3. Effects of Bryant's Defects: Confounding the Policy of
Crawford
The Court must clarify its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence after
the Bryant decision, and until it does, lower courts will be left trying to
decipher its meaning. Not even the Supreme Court employed the Bryant
analysis in the subsequent Bullcoming decision.' 9' Justice Ginsburg, writ-
ing for the majority, relegated the ideas in Bryant to a passing reference
that quoted Crawford.19 2 Although it is plausible that the Bryant analysis
was unnecessary to decide whether the lab tests in Bullcoming were tes-
timonial, especially given Melendez-Diaz,'9 3 this view does not square
with Justice Sotomayor's concurrence that reads as an effort to rehabili-
tate and apply the Bryant analysis to the context of documents.19 4 Her
attempt to display the functionality of the Bryant analysis was not con-
vincing: if the other members of the Supreme Court are unable or unwill-
ing to employ Bryant, how are lower courts going to make practical use
184. Id at 1175 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 63, 68
(2004)).
185. YOGI BERRA, WHEN YOU COME TO A FORK IN THE ROAD, TAKE IT! INSPIRATION AND
WISDOM FROM ONE OF BASEBALL'S GREATEST HEROES (2001).
186. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160 (majority opinion) ("[O]ur discussion ... should not be taken
to imply that the existence vel non of an ongoing emergency is dispositive of the testimonial in-
quiry.").
187. Id.atl157-60.
188. Id. at 1160.
189. Id. at 1160-62.
190. Id.atll57.
191. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011).
192. Id
193. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).
194. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2719-20 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I write separately first to
highlight why I view the report at issue to be testimonial-specifically because its 'primary purpose'
is evidentiary ..... ).
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of the decision? The Bryant analysis is too amorphous and convoluted to
be a useful tool unless pieces of it are merely employed to reach the con-
clusion that one has already decided upon.'
The Bryant decision reduces the guarantee of the Confrontation
Clause to a suggestion. 196 Bryant weakens the Confrontation Clause be-
cause it fosters unfettered judicial discretion, allowing for a variety of
results in many cases.19 7 Lower courts should consider "all relevant in-
formation" in the analysis as the Court intends,'98 but may not know
what to do with it. Conscientious efforts to apply such a confused, multi-
tiered approach will inevitably yield unpredictable results in cases poten-
tially involving the Confrontation Clause.1 99 As Justice Thomas wrote,
this merely repeats the main mischief of the reliability test and under-
mines the central policy of Crawford.2 00 The Court argued in Crawford
that the "principal evil" the Confrontation Clause was meant to prohibit
was the use of ex parte examinations against defendants because of the
danger of "prosecutorial abuse."20' The Court reasoned that if the policy
goal is to protect criminal defendants from the possibility of government
abuse, then government agents must not be given wide latitude in the
application of the protection. 20 2 "The Framers . . . knew that judges, like
other government officers, could not always be trusted to safeguard the
rights of the people . . .. They were loath to leave too much discretion in
judicial hands." 20 3 Thus, the Framers intended to limit judicial discretion
in application of the Confrontation Clause, and honoring this intent was
fundamental to the holding in Crawford. The amorphous, multi-factored
balancing test forwarded in Bryant significantly loosens the reins on ju-
dicial discretion and, thereby, does violence to the guiding policy of
Crawford.
B. Originalism Confronts Pragmatism
If Bryant indeed weakens and narrows the Confrontation Clause, as
argued here, then it begs another question: is that result desirable or not?
195. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("And when all else fails, a court can
mix-and-match perspectives to reach its desired outcome.").
196. See id.
197. Id. at 1170 ("The only virtue of the Court's approach (if it can be misnamed a virtue) is
that it leaves judges free to reach the 'fairest' result under the totality of the circumstances.").
198. Id. at 1162 (majority opinion).
199. An apt analogy might be the Lemon purpose test for statutes under the Establishment
Clause, with its three prongs: first, that the statute possesses a secular legislative purpose; second,
that its primary effect neither enhances nor inhibits religion; and third, it does not foster excessive
government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). Courts
and scholars have criticized the Lemon test. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 582-83 (1987);
see also Jesse H. Choper, The Religion Clauses ofthe First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41
U. Pin. L. REv. 673, 680-81 (1980).
200. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50, 56 (2004).
202. See id at 67-68.
203. Id at 67.
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After all, Richard Bryant was an alleged cocaine dealer who probably
shot a man on his back porch,20 so what harm is there in allowing the
admission of evidence that puts him behind bars? Strong practical and
emotional arguments support expanding judicial discretion to find the
fairest result in criminal prosecutions.20 5 Nevertheless, these are the very
impulses that the Confrontation Clause is meant to guard against. 206
This section will set out a framework explaining why a strong Con-
frontation Clause is essential, and why it is preferable to have a strong
rule to protect the confrontation right rather than a fuzzy standard. Next,
under this framework, I will suggest ways that the primary purpose test
articulated in Bryant might be clarified as Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence continues to evolve.20 7
1. Framework: Textual Fidelity Trumped by Practical Ends
The distinction in the reasoning that motivated Justice Scalia's dis-
sent and Justice Sotomayor's majority opinion could hardly be more
stark. In Bryant, the two Justices embodied the familiar dialectic between
rules and standards.2 08 The arguments were also familiar,209 as Justice
Scalia argued for a rule promoting certainty and predictability,2 10 while
Justice Sotomayor argued for a standard allowing flexibility and fact-
specific application. 2 1' However, the rules versus standards debate was
the result of their divergent thinking, not the cause of it.
The reasoning in Crawford began with a quest for what the words
of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause meant to the Framers.212
Whether one feels that quest was successful or not, the majority of the
Court agreed on a meaning: the Confrontation Clause demands cross-
213examination of those who bear testimony. Next, the Court decided that
the reliability test of Ohio v. Roberts violated that intended meaning by
introducing an unacceptable degree of judicial discretion: "By replacing
categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended balancing tests, we
do violence to their design. Vague standards are manipulable . . . ."214 So,
204. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting); See also People v. Bryant, 768
N.W.2d 65,67 (Mich. 2009).
205. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 1442-45.
206. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67-68.
207. The Supreme Court has already granted certiorari to hear a Confrontation Clause case in
its next term. Williams v. Illinois, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011).
208. Justice Scalia acknowledged that he prefers a strong rule governing Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, but not for its own sake. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 ("In any case, we did not disavow
multifactor balancing for reliability in Crawford out of a preference for rules over standards. We did
so because 'it d[id] violence' to the Framers' design." (alteration in original) (quoting Crawford, 541
U.S. at 68)).
209. See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 383-85 (1985).
210. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176.
211. See id at 1162 (majority opinion).
212. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42-50.
213. Id at 68-69.
214. Id at 67-68.
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the Court adopted a new test, the bright-line testimonial rule of Craw-
ford.2 15 Thus, the textual meaning of the Sixth Amendment was the mo-
tivating force, and the strong rule was the result.2 16 That approach is what
allowed the bold stroke of Crawford and its single-minded goal of deci-
phering the constitutional meaning despite the many questions it left un-
answered. 2 17 Justice Scalia has proved obstinate in his dedication to this
idealistic path of constitutional interpretation, even when it leads him to
the edge of a policy abyss.218
Compared to Crawford's idealism, the Court's opinion in Bryant
worked backwards. The motivating logic began with extreme factual
scenarios, such as snipers on the loose, to justify a broad ongoing emer-
gency exception.2 1 9 Then the Court set about forging paths that might
allow courts many avenues to reach the right conclusion-such as the
weapon used, the victims wounded, the range of people at risk, the pur-
poses involved, the informality of the investigation, or even reliability of
the evidence. 2 20 Thus, the practical consequences were the motivating
force, and the standard was the result. The Bryant decision did not just
remodel the analytical framework of Crawford; it compromised the
foundation.
Bryant's multi-factor balancing act expressly pushed the primary
purpose test in the direction of a flexible standard.22 1 On a deeper level,
Bryant also shifted from the idealism of Justice Scalia's originalist argu-
ments to a brand of pragmatism that holds that the practical ends dictate
the analytical means, and that truth is determined not in the abstract but
by its consequences.222 This is a plausible view, but it should be recog-
215. See id. at 68.
216. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1176 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
217. For example, the Crawford Court left "leave for another day any effort to spell out a
comprehensive definition of 'testimonial. "'Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
218. See, e.g., Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 207-09 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(stating that "failure to pay a tax in the good-faith belief that it is not legally owing is not 'willful"'
even if the belief is based on the erroneous assumption that the tax is unconstitutional). Even if
Justice Scalia's position was logically superior, the policy ramifications of allowing every citizen
who erroneously believes a tax is unconstitutional to refuse to pay it with no legal consequence is
staggering. And yet, the practical consequences seemed to play no overt part in his reasoning.
219. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164, 1168 (majority opinion).
220. Id. at 1150-67. This search is reminiscent of the open-ended search for indicia of reliabil-
ity that was criticized by Justice Marshall long before it was criticized by Justice Scalia. See Dutton
v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 109-10 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("I am troubled by the fact that the
plurality ... begins a hunt for whatever 'indicia of reliability' may cling to Williams' remark.. . . If
'indicia of reliability' are so easy to come by, and prove so much, then it is only reasonable to ask
whether the Confrontation Clause has any independent vitality at all in protecting a criminal defend-
ant against the use of extrajudicial statements not subject to cross-examination and not exposed to a
jury assessment of the declarant's demeanor at trial.").
221. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162.
222. I refer here not to the common definition of pragmatism as a broad term for utility and
flexibility, but to the older philosophical definition of pragmatism as a method of evaluating the truth
of competing notions by weighing their practical consequences. See WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM
AND THE MEANING OF TRUTH, 28 (1996) ("The pragmatic method .... is to try to interpret each
notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to
anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true?").
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nized that it is at odds with the reasoning that it purported to follow. The
Crawford rule began with the meaning of the Constitution and allowed
for some flexibility; the Bryant standard began with a pragmatic eye to-
ward consequences and allowed for constitutional protections.223 The
effect is similar results, reached by different paths.224
The modest task presented by the Bryant case was to apply the rea-
soning of Crawford and Davis to the facts of a possible emergency and,
thereby, fill one of the gaps in this evolving jurisprudence. The Court's
decision failed in this task by creating a broad exception giving life to
never-ending emergencies, 22 5 and consequently, widened the gap of un-
answered questions rather than narrowing it. More importantly, the Court
departed from the guiding principles of Crawford, killing its motivating
logic without bothering to bury the corpse.
a. Viewing the Dialectic on a Spectrum
A dialectic is nearly always a helpful oversimplification, an attempt
to divide the world in half along a clean line. So it is with the division of
rules versus standards. And so it is with the idealism versus pragmatism
that motivated the competing primary purpose tests. In reality, these dis-
tinctions are never so clean. Legal thinking, in particular, can never be
wholly idealistic. 2 26 Pragmatic considerations are bound up with the task
of responding to specific cases and controversies; even the originalist
must apply his understanding of the Constitution's text to the facts at
hand. The legal mind must concern itself with the consequences on other
case law and the real world, rather than building Kantian castles in the
air. A relevant example is Justice Thomas's formality test for testimonial
evidence, 22 7 which is the clearest bright-line rule on the Confrontation
Clause yet articulated. Nevertheless, the other Justices have rejected this
option as an empty exercise that would encourage informal police proce-
dure to obviate the Confrontation Clause rather than protecting the right
to confrontation, 2 28 a purely pragmatic argument built around potential
consequences. Unlike a philosopher, a judge must peer over the bench
and watch his decisions change the lives before him. On the other hand,
223. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004), with Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at
1162-67.
224. Perhaps no one is more aware of this gulf than the Justices themselves, as evidenced by
the curious split of the majority in Bullcoming in part IV of that decision. Justice Ginsburg argued
that the claims of catastrophic practical consequences for prosecutors are dubious, and that even if
they were true these practical concerns would not change the Constitutional interpretation. In other
words, consequences be damned, because idealism animates our Confrontation Clause decisions
under Crawford. She was joined only by Justice Scalia in part IV, and lost the rest of the coalition,
including Justice Sotomayor. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717-20 (2011).
225. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1164-65.
226. See Iredell Jenkins, The Matchmaker or Toward a Synthesis of Legal Idealism and Posi-
tivism, 12 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 1 (1960).
227. See Bryant 131 S. Ct. at 1167 (Thomas, J., concurring).
228. See id. at 1160 (majority opinion) (arguing that informality "does not necessarily indicate
the presence of an emergency or the lack of testimonial intent").
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even the most pragmatic judge must be idealistic enough to respect the
rule of law and the doctrine of stare decisis, even if she does not think it
always yields the "best results."229
Likewise, most law does not fall cleanly within the camps of rules
or standards.23 0 Instead, there is a spectrum: at one end is a rigid rule like
a speed limit, and at the other end is a flexible standard meant to intro-
duce discretion, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 403.231 Most law falls
somewhere in between. Yet, legal tests can lean toward rule or standard;
and the thinking behind the test can begin with the absolutes of idealism
or the consequences of pragmatism. 232 Crawford and its progeny exem-
plify this idea. Crawford established a categorical rule that if evidence is
testimonial it must be subjected to cross-examination, 23 3 but avoided the
messiness of defining testimony. 234 In Davis, the Court began defining
testimonial 235 and was forced to move across the spectrum from rule to-
ward standard with the primary purpose test.2 36 Then, in Bryant, the
Court slid much further across the spectrum toward a loose standard with
its additions to the primary purpose test.23 7
b. Whether a Rule or a Standard Is Superior Depends on
Context
The advantage of viewing rules and standards as intermingled is
that one need not choose which is right in the abstract. They are both
right, and which one should be emphasized depends on the legal context.
Scholars have noted that rules and standards each have their own vices
and virtues.2 3 8 Professor Schlag listed many of these familiar attrib-
utes,239 describing rules as certain and uniform yet rigid and intransigent,
while standards are flexible and open-ended while being indeterminate
and more easily manipulated.2 40 Judge Posner argued that judicial prag-
matism is neutral on the debate between rules and standards in the ab-
stract.241 A conceptual analysis of whether rules or standards are superior
is a needless debate, not only because they are inseparable, but also be-
229. Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 17 (1996).
230. See Schlag, supra note 209, at 404-06.
231. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .").
232. See Eric J. Segall, Justice Scalia, Critical Legal Studies, and the Rule of Law, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 991, 998-99 (1994).
233. See Boyer, supra note 32, at 870 ("Remarkably, Crawford v. Washington rejected the
familiar modem approach, the balancing test, choosing instead a hard-and-fast categorical rule.").
234. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
235. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
236. Id.
237. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150-67 (2011).
238. E.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992).
239. Schlag, supra note 209, at 400.
240. Id.
241. Posner, supra note 229, at 16.
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cause they only have value within a particular legal context.242 If most
agree that rules are valuable because of their rigidity, and standards are
valuable because of their flexibility, then the operative question is
whether the instant legal context would benefit from rigidity or flexibil-
ity.
c. Confrontation Clause Demands Rigidity
Powerful practical arguments buttress the view that the Confronta-
tion Clause should be weakened. There are obvious advantages, such as
speeding up prosecutions and saving money by not calling so many wit-
nesses to the stand.243 Avoiding confrontation would also protect victims
of crime who might be traumatized by facing their tormentors in open
court.244 In this regard, the Confrontation Clause affects domestic vio-
lence and child abuse cases most profoundly. 245 Many victims refuse to
testify, either out of fear or loyalty, and the Confrontation Clause be-
comes a shield for abusers.24 6 For example, when Amy Hammon decided
to stand by the man who had punched her, attacked her daughter, and
pushed her into broken glass, the Confrontation Clause ultimately
blocked the testimony she gave on the night of the violence and protected
her abuser.247
Nonetheless, constitutional protections shield not only the righteous
and sympathetic, but the despicable and unsympathetic. Returning to the
infamous case of Sir Walter Raleigh that is said to have inspired the con-
stitutional Framers, Raleigh was being tried for treason to the king, and
treason against the monarch was the most dangerous form of national
security threat.248 Thus, the state interest was compelling, and yet this
was the example that inspired the Framers to include the Confrontation
Clause in the Sixth Amendment.249 Therefore, we must conclude that the
Confrontation Clause was designed for those situations when the state is
most driven to secure a conviction, when sacrificing the rights of the
accused seems irresistible. 25 0 The Confrontation Clause was created to
protect the unsympathetic defendant-the traitor, the drug dealer, and the
abuser. In the end, it makes little sense to limit the Confrontation Clause
based on pragmatic policy concerns. The Clause is designed to slow the
242. See id.
243. Fenner, supra note 27, at 78.
244. See id. at 80-84.
245. See Ellen Liang Yee, Confronting the "Ongoing Emergency": A Pragmatic Approach to
Hearsay Evidence in the Context of the Sixth Amendment, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 729, 775-79
(2008).
246. See Orenstein, supra note 3, at 1414.
247. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 820-21, 832-34 (2006).
248. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1173 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44, 50 (2004).
250. Id. at 68 ("Framers had an eye toward politically charged cases like Raleigh's-great state




government machine, not hasten it.2 5 1 Likewise, the stirring emotional
arguments that focus on victims of crime are irrelevant reasons to block
the confrontation rights of those presumed innocent. 25 2
The reasons to lean toward a more rigid rule are stronger within the
context of constitutional interpretation than other situations. There is
more reason to look to the past and the weight of the text, as it is the su-
preme law of the land.253 Also, there is more reason to protect a constitu-
tional right with absolutism because it is foundational to our society, and
any decision repugnant to the text is void.254 The need for a strong rule is
particularly acute in the context of the Confrontation Clause. Because
confrontation is meant to protect citizens from government abuse, it is
dangerous to then establish a malleable standard and hand government
agents unlimited discretion over when to apply the protection.255 A loose
standard will not do. As the Framers saw it, the members of the legal
profession are the foxes in a henhouse full of criminal defendants, and
we must exercise the self-control to build a strong barrier for their sake.
The foxes cannot wait until we are hungry and the chickens are at hand
to decide whether we will dine. After Bryant, though, the unsympathetic
criminal defendant will find little protection in the form of the Confron-
tation Clause. "And what has been taken away from him has been taken
away from us all."256
2. Solution: Ruling the Standard
Given the framework above, this section provides two proposals to
push the determination of what constitutes testimonial evidence across
the spectrum from flexible standard toward a more rigid rule. First, the
ongoing emergency exception should be narrower and more definite.
Second, the primary purpose test should be made as simple and objective
as possible.
a. Narrowing and Strengthening the Ongoing Emergency
Exception
The ongoing emergency exception need not be so broad; rather, an
exception to confrontation should indeed require exceptional circum-
stances. 257 The appropriate scope of the emergency exception lasts while
the alleged criminal act is occurring, and courts should require positive
251. See Fenner, supra note 27, at 79-80.
252. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 ("Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obvi-
ously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.").
253. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
254. Id.
255. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
256. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1176 (2011) (majority opinion).
257. As mentioned above, other possible exceptions include the narrow categories of forfeiture
and dying declarations, but after the Bryant decision, the ongoing emergency exception will likely be
implicated most frequently. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 358-60, 62 (2008); Bryant, 131 S.
Ct. at 1176-77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
2952011]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
evidence of a continuing threat to extend the emergency. 258 Even within
the narrow scope of an ongoing emergency thus construed, trial judges
should require that the content of the statements be reasonably related to
the goal of resolving the emergency. However, if an ongoing emergency
does yield statements reasonably calculated to resolve the emergency, the
emergency exception should be dispositive, because the hearsay is neces-
sarly nontestimonial. 25 9 The Bryant decision effectively reduced an on-
going emergency from an exception to a factor, and then broadened the
definition of an emergency. 26 0 A move toward a clear rule demands the
opposite: (1) narrow the definition of an emergency, (2) give it a definite
end-point, and then (3) restore to an ongoing emergency the force of an
exception. This solution fosters predictability and certainty.
The simple distinction between a present-tense danger and a past-
tense crime offers some guidance. Is the interrogation focused on "what
is happening" or "what happened"? 261 Is it more like Michelle
McCottry's 911 call while being attacked,262 or more like Amy
Hammon's conversation with police after being attacked?263 The Court
made an even finer distinction in Davis, reasoning that the 911 call was
nontestimonial during the criminal act, but the conversation turned testi-
monial seconds later once the attacker fled and the interrogator began to
collect evidence. 264 The 911 operator did not need to know the attacker's
middle name, for example, to respond to the emergency.265 The transition
from nontestimonial to testimonial thus hinged on two factors: (1) the
end of the criminal act, even though the attacker was still on the loose,
and (2) the content of the statements were no longer reasonably related to
ending the emergency. The Court should return to that narrow under-
standing of an ongoing emergency.
Likewise, courts should draw a line between the alleged criminal act
and the consequences of the act. The emergency continues while the al-
leged criminal act is ongoing, not because the consequences of the action
are ongoing. Michelle McCottry's injuries did not extend the duration of
the emergency once her attacker fled;26 6 Kenneth Lee's stab wounds did
not extend the duration of the emergency to include Sylvia Crawford's
interrogation hours later.267 Anthony Covington's medical condition,
likewise, was a consequence of the attack but not part of the attack; in-
258. But see Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 164 (majority opinion).
259. But see id. at 1157, 1160.
260. See id at 1157-60, 63-67.
261. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827, 830 (2006).
262. Id at 817-18.
263. Id. at 819-21.
264. Id at 818, 828-29.
265. See id. at 818, 828.
266. See idat 818, 828-29.
267. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38, 68 (2004).
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deed, his critical medical condition persisted for hours, until his death. 268
Consequences of a crime-such as a critical medical condition-can
persist for hours, days, or years, providing no end to the emergency and
allowing for organized interrogations under the guise of emergency re-
sponse. Such circumstances lead to the type of mistake that occurred in
Bryant, where the Court concluded that statements such as "Rick shot
me" and a physical description of Rick were somehow essential to the
purpose of receiving medical care.269
The paradigm should not start with the vision of a rooftop sniper
terrorizing a city and then render a loose standard accordingly. Yes, a
gun could make an emergency more far-reaching. Yes, a killer on the
loose could threaten many lives. But there is no need for relying on con-
jecture or a lack of evidence indicating that an assailant has not been
arrested to assume an emergency is ongoing and widespread destruction
is nigh.270 Courts should require specific, positive evidence of an ongoing
threat in order to extend the scope of the emergency.271 As the Court not-
ed in Bryant, this determination should not be based on the wisdom of
hindsight.272 If an attacker was holding hostages during a stand-off with
police, the emergency would be ongoing, even if unbeknownst to police
the attacker had killed himself hours ago.273 Nevertheless, absent positive
evidence that a threat is ongoing, it should not be presumed to continue
because of imagined scenarios and needless factors. Courts should not
necessarily assume that an abuser who killed his wife is less dangerous
than a man who killed an acquaintance, or that a knife-wielding maniac
is less dangerous than a shooter.274 The facts should guide the inquiry.
The reliance on imagined scenarios is the flaw that leads to never-ending
emergencies, and that is why the Court could not conclude with certainty
that the ongoing emergency ended at any point before Bryant was arrest-
ed a year later in California.2 75 Requiring positive evidence of an ongoing
criminal act gives the emergency a definite end-point.
Significantly, this requirement also prevents the Court from subtly
shifting the burden of persuasion from the state to the defendant. The
state must prove the evidence was nontestimonial; 27 6 by allowing conjec-
ture to extend emergencies indefinitely, the Court instead forces defend-
ants to prove when the threat ended and the hearsay became testimonial.
268. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
269. Id. at ll60-62, 1165.
270. But see id. at 1164.
271. See DEBORAH JONES MERRITr & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE
FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 56 (2009) (explaining the pitfalls of relying on negative
evidence).
272. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1157 n.8.
273. See id.
274. But see id. at 1158-59 (assuming that domestic violence and non-firearm violence poses a
smaller circle of risk).
275. Id. at 1164-65.
276. United States v. Jackson, 636 F.3d 687, 695-96 (5th Cir. 2011).
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Must Richard Bryant now prove that if he once posed a threat, he no
longer posed a threat during the interrogation, and that the content of the
exchange was meant to prosecute him? That is an unfair burden.
In Bryant, the Court broadened the ongoing emergency definition,
but at the same time insisted that "the existence vel non" of an emergen-
cy is only one more factor in the primary purpose inquiry rather than an
exception.277 In this way, the Court widened and weakened the analytical
effect of an ongoing emergency, leading to increased discretion and un-
predictability. The proposed solution is to reverse this development,
making the application of the exception narrower by requiring the state-
ments to be reasonably related to ending an alleged criminal act that is
occurring, and then making the effect of the exception conclusive. 27 8
Applying these changes to the facts of Bryant, the emergency was
ongoing while Anthony Covington was shot and continued while he was
fleeing from Richard Bryant's property to his car. There is no evidence
to indicate that Bryant followed Covington or posed a continuing threat
to Covington or anyone else. 2 79 Therefore, the emergency ended when
Covington successfully got away from Bryant. Of course, the conse-
quences of the attack continued until Covington's death hours later from
the gunshot wound, 2 80 but the emergency itself did not. Police officers
arrived at the gas station after the conclusion of the emergency, 281 and
therefore, the interrogation did not fall within the ongoing emergency
exception. Even though the consequences of the attack were more dire
than those found in Davis or Hammon, the interrogation of Covington by
several police officers while waiting for medical personnel more closely
resembles the questioning of Amy Hammon than it does Michelle
McCottry's frantic call for help. 2 8 2 The criminal act was completed with
no evidence of a continued threat, and the content of the interrogation
was not limited to responding to an emergency.
This approach may be criticized as too narrow, as common sense
might indicate that a man bleeding from a gunshot wound constitutes an
emergency. While it is an emergency in a general sense, it is not an on-
going emergency in the sense that one suffering from a gunshot wound
cannot possibly be trying to communicate testimony against the shooter.
277. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1160.
278. In this way, the emergency exception follows the path of the forfeiture exception explored
in Giles. There, the Court made the forfeiture exception narrow by requiring the intent of the defend-
ant to eliminate the testimony of the unavailable witness, but when the narrow exception applies it is
dispositive. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359-60, 367-68 (2008).
279. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[Covington] knew the threatening
situation had ended six blocks away and 25 minutes earlier when he fled from Bryant's back porch."
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
280. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
281. See id.




The proposed inquiry would also remain fact-specific and somewhat
arbitrary as to when the emergency ends. Did the action end when the
bullet entered Covington's body, when he reached his car, or when the
car reached the gas station? The line should perhaps be drawn when he
reached his car, because Bryant apparently did not follow him out of the
house. The criticism is correct, though; this is not an exact science. How-
ever, the proposed changes improve on Bryant because the end of an
emergency should be drawn more narrowly. 283 If the test errs, it is better
to err on the side of preserving the right to confrontation than it is to err
on the side of denying the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants.284 The
Bryant Court was correct that the analysis of an emergency must be con-
text-dependent, 285 but that reasoning is more cogent if we rely on the
facts in the context presented rather than worst-case scenarios when de-
ciding the point at which the emergency exception ended.
A final question is why the ongoing emergency exception is being
treated separately from the primary purpose test. The Court presented the
analysis as an either-or test: the purpose of the hearsay is either testimo-
nial or for another purpose like an ongoing emergency.2 86 As explained
below, perhaps the question should be reduced to whether the evidence
was testimonial or not. An ongoing emergency should be a narrow ex-
ception to the rule, not part of the main inquiry. Thus, the ongoing emer-
gency exception, when presented by the particular facts of a case, may be
considered. If the interrogation occurred within the narrow slice of an
ongoing criminal act, and the statements are reasonably related to ending
the emergency, then the evidence is not testimonial and the inquiry is
done.
b. Turning the Primary Purpose Standard into a Rule
Guided by the idea that protecting the constitutional right to con-
frontation is best served by the application of a rigid but functional rule,
the goal is to make the test as simple and objective as possible without
sacrificing accuracy. The test has gathered some unnecessary ornamenta-
tion that can be removed, and the analysis of "purpose" should be simpli-
fied. Therefore, the suggested solution is to begin by removing the un-
necessary factors of reliability and formality, and then focusing the anal-
ysis on the objective function of the interrogation.
283. Another possible, although, in my opinion, less optimal, solution would be to redact
segments of the interrogation that occurred after the purpose had clearly become testimonial. Justice
Scalia suggested that even if the emergency was ongoing when the first police officer arrived at the
scene, the primary purpose of the interrogation had evolved into gathering testimony by the time a
fifth police officer was asking redundant questions. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1172 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 828-29 (recommending redaction after the function of the interro-
gation quickly evolved from resolving the emergency to producing testimony).
284. Cf Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 109 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
285. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158 (majority opinion).
286. See id. at 1155-57, 1165.
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i. Jettison Reliability
The most straightforward improvement is to remove the reliability
factor that the Court included in its Bryant analysis. 2 87 Not only does this
analogy make little sense under the reasoning of Crawford, it threatens to
confuse the holding of Crawford by reanimating the overruled reliability
reasoning of Roberts.2 88 "Reliability" and "testimonial" are not analo-
gous terms, and they often have an inverse relationship. 2 89 Reliability
should be ignored in a testimonial analysis.
ii. Jettison Formality as an Independent Factor
The next unnecessary bauble to remove from the testimonial analy-
sis is the independent factor of formality. This factor sticks around, it
seems, to ensure Justice Thomas's support in 5-4 decisions. 2 90 Putting
aside the realities of cobbling together a majority, the testimonial analy-
sis would be improved without treating formality as an independent fac-
tor. As Justice Sotomayor wrote in Bryant, formality supports the argu-
ment that evidence is testimony, but lack of formality tells us little.
The danger of this independent factor has been borne out in state courts
that cling to the bright-line rule of formality while ignoring the meat of
the testimonial inquiry,2 92 thereby finding the evidence to be
nontestimonial because it lacks formality, a basis that the majority of the
Court has deemed meaningless. When lower courts are finding evidence
nontestimonial on the basis of a meaningless distinction, then the test has
led them astray.
iii. Examine the Function of the Encounter
The difficulty of reforming the primary purpose test is that its de-
velopment in Bryant was more akin to mission creep than an abrupt
change of course. Many of the necessary changes are semantic, but may
yield important results as Confrontation Clause jurisprudence continues
to evolve.
First, the term "purpose" should be replaced with "function," mak-
ing it the "primary function test." This change would make the goal of
the test clear and avoid the ambiguity of the word "purpose," as its mean-
ing shifts between function and motive.2 93 This semantic slip clouded the
287. Id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
288. Id at 1174-75.
289. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 61-64, 65 (2004).
290. See Fenner, supra note 27, at 39-40.
291. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 160 (majority opinion).
292. See Ware v. State, No. CR-08-1177, 2011 WL 1088724, at *13 (Ala. Crim. App. Mar. 25,
2011) ("[W]e agree with the State's argument that the Melendez-Diaz definition of testimonial was
limited to formalized testimonial materials, i.e., affidavits.").
293. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 841-42 (2006) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Court's reasoning in Bryant and threatens to cause the same confusion
for other courts.
Second, the test should be framed as the "primary function of the
encounter," rather than the primary purpose of a reasonable participant.
The Court in Bryant shifted back and forth between stating the test as an
inquiry into the purpose of the interrogation and an inquiry into the pur-
pose of participants,2 94 and thereby shifted between meanings of the term
"purpose" throughout the opinion. An examination of the "function of
the encounter" further clarifies that the test is not probing intent or inter-
nal motivations, and puts the test on more objective ground. The Court's
analysis should be limited to external facts in an objective test, excluding
subjective wanderings such as whether a wounded man can form a pur-
pose and the intent of each actor. Focusing on the encounter instead of
participants forwards that goal.
The Court's test probing the purpose of the participants also led it to
ask: Whose purpose matters? The majority reasoned that the purpose of
each participant matters,295 while the dissent, when forced, argued that it
is the "declarant's intent that counts."29 6 The only useful part of this ex-
change is that it strips off the final veneer of objectivity in the primary
purpose test, as the Justices acknowledge they have moved into the sub-
jective territory of intent. Frankly, the Court is asking the wrong ques-
tion. Examining the function of the encounter need not separate each
individual's purpose because they are indeterminate and, in the end, ir-
relevant. Never mind the shifting purposes of the declarant or the crowd
of interrogators. Never mind the futile attempt to suss out what internal
motivations were present and perhaps primary. The test should discern
the function of an encounter based on external statements, behavior, and
context, explicitly ignoring the internal motivations sparked by the exter-
nal stimuli. Just as courts do not care if a contracting party was secretly
joking, they should not care if a declarant harbored a secret purpose. The
proper question is not whose purpose matters, but whether the external
facts indicate that the function of the encounter was to produce testimo-
ny 297
Applying this rule to the facts of Bryant, the central question is
whether the external facts indicate that the primary function of the en-
294. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156-57.
295. Id. at 1160-61.
296. Id. at I168 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
297. This solution-like the majority solution in Bryant-has implications for co-conspirator
statements elicited through undercover operations. Although the function of that encounter seems to
be testimonial (otherwise it would never have occurred), the ramifications of such a finding would
be significant. The topic is explored thoughtfully by Professor Seigel. Michael L. Seigel & Daniel
Weisman, The Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Statements in a Post-Crawford World, 34 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 877, 890-91, 901-04 (2007); see also Sheila K. Hyatt, Telling Lies to Sylvia Crawford,
DULR ONLNE (Mar. 17, 2011 9:16 AM), http://www.denverlawreview.org/practitioners-
pieces/2011/3/17/telling-lies-to-sylvia-crawford.html.
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counter was testimonial. None of the possible exceptions apply: forfei-
ture is eliminated because there is no evidence Bryant shot Covington to
stop his testimony; the dying declaration, if preserved, would probably
not apply as Covington eagerly anticipated medical help, presumably in
the hope he might live; 298 and, as argued above, the emergency had al-
ready concluded even though the consequences of the emergency contin-
ued.
The encounter occurred by happenstance, so it was not planned or
created to produce testimony. Police officers simply responded to a call
for assistance.29 9 However, the words and behavior of the participants
paint a different picture. The questions of who shot Covington, the at-
tacker's height and weight, and where and how it happened serve a tes-
timonial function. 3 00 The questioning was phrased in the past tense as
recounted by police officers, 301 hence investigating a past crime rather
than a present danger. Five separate officers questioned Covington as he
waited for medical help,3 02 indicating that the primary function was to
elicit information from the declarant, not perform emergency aid-surely
one officer would be enough to gather vital information in a life-
threatening situation, while others faced the danger. If the primary func-
tion of the encounter had been to respond to a present danger, the police
officers would probably have behaved differently. If the primary function
of the encounter had been to render aid to Covington, questions seeking a
physical description of his attacker need not have been asked. Police
officers were doing their job admirably, trying under difficult circum-
stances to gather pertinent information to help them get the bad guy. That
was the primary function of this encounter between Covington and police
officers. Of course, getting the bad guy means catching him and then
putting him behind bars with evidence at trial. Therefore, the objective
evidence-words, behavior, and context-indicates that the primary
function of the encounter was testimonial, and the testimonial hearsay
implicated the right to confrontation.
This is not a perfect solution. The proposed changes rely largely on
semantic rather than substantive changes to the rule. However, words
matter. In Bryant, an ambiguous word (purpose) gave way to a faulty
question (whose purpose?). That, in turn, led the test to focus on internal
motivations instead of external facts. Relying on external facts to deter-
mine the primary function of an encounter should allow courts to ap-
proach the question in a more objective fashion. Also, the framing of a
simpler, yes-or-no test eliminates the open-ended, multi-factor analysis
that Bryant invited. The test is still fact-specific, to be sure, but not so
298. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1171.
299. Id. at 1150 (majority opinion).
300. Id. at 1171 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
301. Id at 1170.
302. Id. at 1168, 1170-71.
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amorphous. That change slides the test across the spectrum toward a
strong rule. A strong rule is preferable in the context of constitutional
interpretation, particularly when the policy is to restrain government
abuse against citizens.
CONCLUSION
The bewildering primary purpose test employed by Bryant seems
likely to lead to unpredictable outcomes in the lower courts and nearly
unfettered judicial discretion to decide what qualifies as testimonial hear-
say. Conscientious efforts to follow the Bryant analysis could yield con-
tradictory results, as courts attempt to navigate the maze of sub-factors
informing emergency, formality, purpose, and reliability, and then bal-
ance the four main factors without clear guidance. The expansion of the
ongoing emergency definition necessarily narrows the scope of the Con-
frontation Clause, while the unnecessarily elastic primary purpose test
renders the application of the confrontation right a suggestion rather than
a predictable guarantee.
While there are powerful pragmatic and emotional arguments for
limiting the application of the Confrontation Clause, the history of the
Clause suggests that it was designed to guard the accused against state
interests precisely when the state's concerns seem most compelling.
William Reed
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